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at the

CREATION
The University's L a w School finds that
framing democratic constitutions in
post-Communist nations is an exercise in
patience—for both the creators
and those looking on.

Two years after East Germany idled its production, the Trabant lives
on in scattered sightings throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
While thousands of the mostly fiberglass carcasses of the tiny,
exhaust-belching automobile—once the only car to be had in East
Germany—litter the countryside, a tenacious few can still be found
wheezing through the streets of the liberated Soviet bloc, tarnished
symbols of Communism's obsolescence.
N o w imagine a Trabant rolling d o w n a hill. Unable to stop the m o m e n t u m but desperate to control it, bewildered mechanics feverishly try changing the low-grade parts
in hopes of transforming the two-cylinder contraption into a venerable Mercedes.
Stephen Holmes, a professor in political science and the L a w School, uses this
metaphor of the scrappy car to describe the process of drafting constitutions in the
countries once veiled by the Iron Curtain. The constitutions are the paper versions of
Trabants, the provisions are the hodgepodge of parts, and the flustered Central and
East European politicians and government officials are the mechanics charged with the
duty of running alongside to avert disaster. Instead of racing toward a finish that
rewards hard work and perseverance, however, East Europeans are finding the reality
of creating constitutions to be far more circuitous and far less noble than they had
expected—wavering somewhere between the realms of necessity and absurdity.

BYJACLYN H. PARK
ILLUSTRATIONS BY STEVE McCRACKEN
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Complicating the effort is the unprecedented demand that most Central and East
European countries pen new constitutions
while simultaneously moving from autocracy to democracy and from c o m m a n d to
privatized markets. Those drafting constitutions find themselves saddled with an endless stream of urgent decisions, ranging
from choosing a form of popular representation to providing stable currency. Meanwhile, political instability has m a d e the
drafters in several countries feel their o w n
mortality—those in charge today m a y be
gone tomorrow.
Stephen Holmes is part of a
cadre of University scholars fascinated by this process—warts
and all—of distilling a higher
law, one that cannot be
changed by the ordinary lawmaking procedures of a popularly elected congress or
parliament. With Communism's collapse in
late 1989, this desire to view constitutional
history in the making motivated Holmes,
along with political science/philosophy prolessor Jon Elstcr and law/political science
prolcssor Cass Sunstcin, to found the
Center for the Study of Constitutionalism
in Eastern Europe, under the auspices of
the U of C's L a w School. Although Holmes,
Elster, and Sunstcin had been discussing
the idea of a center for several months, its
genesis came in a split-second decision.
Elster and then University provost Gerhard Casper were attending a series of
European conferences in 1990 w h e n they
met Wictor Osiatynski of Poland and
Andras Sajo of H u n g a r y , both highly
regarded legal scholars. "Casper and 1
decided right then and there," Elster recalls
of the chance encounter, "to commission
them to write papers for a center that had
not yet formally been created."
F r o m this prophetic beginning, the
Center has thrived in a similar, catch-ascatch-can vein. Despite chaotic events in
Europe and staggering paperwork on the
U.S. end of operations—which are run from
an overflowing'office in the D'Angelo L a w
Library—the U of C project has established
itself as an authority on the constitutionm a k i n g process throughout Europe:
employing local correspondents in the 15
nations it n o w covers, building extensive
archives of documents and audio and video
tapes, holding conferences both in Europe
and Chicago, publishing the quarterly East
European Constitutional Review, and planning a b o o k scries of essays on topics
related to constitutionalism.
The Center's work is funded in large part
by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, which has provided $300,000
20

over three years, and by the Ford Foundation, which gave $50,000 in seed m o n e y
and recently upped its contribution to more
than $100,000 because of the Review's success. In addition, the Soros Foundation
contributes $150,000 a year which the
Center must spend in Eastern Europe. Created by Hungarian-born currency speculator George Soros, the foundation supports
the Center as an affiliation of the Central
European University, which Soros also
founded from ground zero in 1990. In
return for Soros' support, the L a w School
regularly sends faculty to the C E U . Professors H o l m e s and Lawrence Lessig, for
example, have spent s u m m e r s teaching

from the Chicago center and the Review to
do that work as well as to feed its scholars.
"Just putting out a journal on constitutional processes," Klingsberg says, "serves a
neglected community."
It's a service that requires a lot of legwork.
Dwight Semler, AM'87, a Ph.D. candidate in
political science, navigates the Center's
logistical labyrinth as its executive director
and chief administrator. His job is to keep
the Center's loose network of 15 to 20 correspondents and other European employees
(the Center operates a small office of four in
M o s c o w ) paid and happy, and to answer to
the University comptroller w h e n the only
receipts the Center can produce are in

constitutional law at the c a m p u s in
Budapest.
Ethan Klingsberg, director for the Soros
Foundation's Institute of Constitutional and
Legislative P o l i c y — w h a t he calls the
"activist cousin of the Chicago center"—
says the institute works with Central European officials on drafts of laws and educational seminars, but relies on materials

Cyrillic. Semler estimates that the study
project costs about $300,000 a year, with
his monthly phone bills alone regularly topping $2,000 and monthly subscriptions to
European periodicals hovering near $3,000.
Correspondents receive roughly $500 for
each quarterly report they submit to the
Center. Making the job even more attractive, the L a w School provides computers
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and the chance to travel regularly to western Europe and the United States for conferences o n constitutionalism—both
inducements to scholars in economically
ravaged countries.
Even though the Center scored a coup by
signing up Wictor Osiatynski and Andras
Sajo as correspondents, professors Holmes
and Elster discovered that locating one or
two observers to report from other countries would be far from easy. The two m e n
traveled throughout Eastern Europe several
times in late 1990 and early 1991, reviewing writing samples and interviewing and
courting candidates. Although candidates
had to have a thorough knowledge of law
and/or current events in the
region, be proficient in
English, and be "pure" of
an apparatchik past, the
professors found they had
to adjust their standards to
take into account each
country's culture.
"If you can't w o r k with
former C o m m u n i s t party
members," Semler points
out, "you can't work with
anybody in Russia."
The
correspondents'
reports, along with any
supporting documentation,
are used as the basis for the
country-by-country
updates on constitutionmaking progress published
in the quarterly Review.
Each issue of the Review
also focuses on a single
topic that concerns the
countries in transition: for
example, separation of
powers', h u m a n rights; or
lustration—the opening of
secret government files.
N o w available in Russian as
well as English, the scholarly journal already has
b e c o m e s o m e w h a t of a
feather in the Center's cap,
according to Semler, with
Central and East European
policy-makers and an
international audience of
academics relying on its
scope and analysis of events.
"You can go into parliaments all over
Eastern Europe and find the Review on the
table," reports Semler, w h o speaks from
experience—he estimates that he's logged
some 100,000-plus frequent-flyer miles on
trips to and around the area.
As the Center for the Study of Constitutionalism has grown from studying seven

countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, H u n g a r y , Albania, Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia) to m o r e than double that
n u m b e r with the breakup of the Soviet
Union, it concurrently has cultivated crossing boundaries between academic disciplines.
"The L a w School has long had a tradition
of having important roots in interdisciplinary work," says dean Geoffrey Stone,
JD'71, w h o gave the Center the green light
and secured its initial fundings. "Law and
economics is the most visible example, but
legal history is another. It would be very
unnatural for most other law schools to
have a center that came from two people in
political science—Holmes and Elster—but
at Chicago that was quite natural."
While the L a w School and political science department already have made a marriage of it, the Center also hopes to bring
the history and Slavic departments into the
fold once events in Eastern Europe stabilize, says Elster.
"The Center has to be an interdisciplinary
project," H o l m es agrees. "Post-Communism is a terrain, not a discipline. It's never
been studied before because it never existed
before. There is no intellectual framework
that is adequate to it.
"The area-studies people w h o were studying this part of the world had little or no
competence in markets, Western legal systems, or reform of bureaucracy. A n d people
w h o studied those things never studied this
part of the world. Therefore, w e need talents, insights, and intellectual techniques
from all disciplines to tackle this."

The spectators, besides Chicago, include
the American Bar Association. In 1989, the
A B A launched its Central and East European L a w Initiative, which actually has A B A
attorneys reading, commenting, and advising on drafts of laws and advocating an
ongoing relationship approach to aid. T w o
other well-known institutions, the Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet and PostSoviet Studies and the Harrirnan Institute at
Columbia University, both maintain offices
or affiliates in Eastern Europe as well. Their
main objective, however, is to train American scholars interested in researching and
teaching on Eastern Europe.
The ABA's Central and East European
L a w Initiative sees itself as being a "guidepost" for countries drafting constitutions,
says its executive director M a r k Ellis. Its
hands-on aid includes sponsoring technical
assistance workshops where both American
and West European lawyers study and discuss drafts of constitutions—often two or
three times a year as drafts are revised.
Another program places resident liaisons,
American legal specialists w h o live in a host
country for up to a year and serve as advisers on a gamut of Initiative projects.
" W e don't send anybody over there unless
we're invited," Ellis emphasizes. "This has
been a request-driven program from the
start, and so there has been an eagerness in
the countries w e have been working in for
assistance."
Although some critics perceive this assitance as amounting to American imperialism, Ellis insists that the experience U.S.
lawyers can share on such issues as an independent judiciary or minority rights is quite
welcome—especially at a time when m a n y
The Center takes a decidedly
hands-off approach to drafting East European nations view creating subconstitutions or critiquing leg- stantive, enforceable constitutions as an
islation for East E u r o p e a n admission ticket into the inner circle of
countries. W h e n pressed, its developed nations.
Unfortunately, these newly liberated states
leaders reluctantly will play advisory roles,
but the Center collectively tries not to pro- have discovered, a constitution, by itself, in
mote this function as a primary objective. no w a y guarantees entry. Eastern Europe
Impartiality not only divorces the Center and the former Soviet republics have
from identification with any one party or emerged dazed and disheveled from a 40formula for constitutional processes, but it year miasma—only to face the specters of
ailing economies, age-old ethnic tensions,
also protects the Center's credibility.
"Our philosophy is that before you help a and the crippling social fallout of C o m m u country," Holmes says, "you should k n o w nism. These crises d e m a n d governmental
what's happening in the c o u n t r y — k n o w triage, and the juggling of priorities forms
what's at stake, what are the problems, w h y the backdrop against which constitutions
the debate is occurring in one way rather are being formulated and academics are
than another.
taking notes.
"It's difficult to overestimate the degree to
"By letting East European countries k n o w
that, in a sense, they're being watched by which our vision of political processes and
Western observers and scholars, it actually political change was shaped by the Cold
affects in a good way what's happening in W a r — t h e division of the world into East
their countries. They want to be watched and West, the battle of Communism," says
because it's useful for them in pushing their Stephen Holmes. "So naturally, as this
reactionary forces d o w n the road a bit."
enmity of East and W e s t collapsed, the
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premises, the presuppositions, and the
framework within the social sciences also
were radically challenged.
"Therefore, it's natural for social scientists
to be attracted to this region, which is the
epicenter for rapid changes that affect us all."
Although Jon Elster has studied
waves of constitution-making
around the world—beginning
in the late 18th century with
the United States and France,
and continuing up through the 1970s w h e n
dictatorships fell in southern E u r o p e — h e
says that the curl engulfing Eastern Europe
today is unprecedented because of its threepronged charge. Unlike the pressed and
powdered, single-minded drafters of the
U.S. document, for example, the haggard
lawmakers of Eastern Europe are grappling
with the need to transform at once from a
c o m m a n d economy to a market economy,
from an autocracy to a democracy, and
from chaos to constitutionalism.
W h a t link the processes of 1993 to 1787,
however, are the motivations that emerge.
Elster enumerates three driving forces in
constitution making—interest, reason, and
passion—which reverberate as true today in
the halls of the Polish Sejm as they did back
in Independence Hall in 1787. Interest is
seen in the political parties and lobbying
groups w h o scramble to leave some indelible mark on the n e w constitutions. Reason,
on the other hand, has been manifested in
institutions such as the constitutional
courts and central banks, created in impartial consideration of the long-term,
c o m m o n good.
"The worst thing is probably passion,"
states Elster, w h o groups seething desires
for retribution and restitution, ethnic
hatred, and envy of wealth under this category. "Backward-looking issues like retribution and restitution will be there for a very
long time. Perhaps clever politicians will be
able to contain these passions, but they are
unbelievably strong—and easy to understand, especially w h e n you see the former
oppressors in some countries becoming the
n e w rich."
The success of establishing any constitution, academics agree, rides on the shoulders of a constitutional culture, in which
people accept the document as a higher law
and refrain from transforming every political battle into a constitutional contest.
While East Europeans are trying on this
kind of culture for size, it takes time to fit
after decades of mismanagement, Holmes
warns.
'When you have a constitutional culture,
people have pious feelings and reverence
toward constitutional rules," he explains.

11

"The fact is that the rules under which
people are operating n o w are ad-hoc compromises created under conditions that have
n o w disappeared. Therefore, it's completely
unreasonable to expect them to be retained."
Wictor Osiatynski, n o w a co-director of
the Chicago Center and a former adviser to
the Constitutional C o m m i s s i o n of the

democracy should operate—and, in fact,
does so in the United States through amendments to the Constitution. W h i l e s o m e
fixed, absolute rules regarding property or
civil rights m a y be installed in Eastern
Europe so that people can learn to live
under these laws and avoid complete anarchy, a freedom develops from continuously

eason, interest, and passion reverberate as true
today in the Polish Sejm as they did back in
Independence Hall in 1787.

Polish senate, coined a game metaphor to
illustrate h o w key players in the East European p o w e r plays create consititutional
guidelines while having a vested interest in
the game's outcome. Because the rules will
determine these leaders' o w n roles in the
future power structure, he observes, selfinterest motivates them to create drafting
procedures and actual constitutions that
give them elevated status or preserve the
staus quo.
Yet Lawrence Lessig, an assistant professor at the L a w School w h o specializes in
separation of p o w e r s , defends such a
skewed g a m e theory as the heart of h o w
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shaping the other rules, he argues. "You
play the game a little bit, you see who's getting hurt, you see who's getting helped, and
whether you can justify it all."

0

ne tendency of the newly liberated East European states is to
weigh d o w n their constitutional drafts with a menagerie
of do's and don'ts. Law/political
science professor Cass Sunstein, also a codirector of the Chicago Center, staunchly
opposes cluttering constitutions, or "overconstitutionalizing." H e points out that the
Communism-inspired predecessors of East

European constitutions often articulated a
litany of "positive" social and economic
rights, as well as duties, for their citizens,
only to turn the value of those stipulations—such as the right to work and the
right to leisure—into little more than ink
on paper.
Instead of learning from these vacuous
promises, several consti••••••••
tutions today have set
their sights even higher,
and guarantee entitlements they are in n o
position to deliver. For
example, Semler says,
the Czech, Slovak,
R o m a n i a n , Bulgarian,
and Hungarian final constitutions all c o m m i t
themselves to an "excessive" stream of positive
rights, such as fair housing, old-age pensions,
and, in some cases, even
the right to a healthy
environment.The
Lithuanian d o c u m e n t ,
moreover, protects the
right to an "adequate"
living standard and the
general right to "adequate payment."
"Generally, the m o r e
absurd or harmful rights
you put in the constitution, the more you risk
devaluing truly impor'X
tant rights like freedom
of speech," Elster adds.
"If people observe that
some
constitutional
rights are not respected,
then they m a y not take
seriously the violation of
the political rights. The
bad rights drive out the
good ones."
Poland's Osiatynski
views his nation's enumeration of social and economic rights as
yet another compromise made on the long
road to forging a constitution. The country's n e w Bill of Rights divides social and
economic rights into two categories: those
that can and should be enforced regardless
of economic conditions (therightsto education, freedom of employment, safe working conditions, basic medical care, and
social security), and those that provide
benefits but are not offered judicial protection (aid to families, advanced health
care, and the protection of the environment). This separation, the Polish scholar
says, provides a sobering recognition of

the nation's limited resources.
Not nearly so receptive to compromise—
and further hamstringing the constitutiondrafting process—is the thorny issue of
lustration, or the opening of secret state and
police files. Lustration amon g most Central
and East Europeans w h o support the tactic
not only aims to punish former members of
the fallen governments for past crimes
against the public, but also to compensate
individuals for any opportunity lost or
harm incurred under a police state.
Opponents of lustration argue that it
echoes with the hollow satisfaction of doing
what is right if not what is good. It's like
opening a Pandora's box, says Osiatynski,
w h o claims that the only reason lustration
worked at all in post-World W a r II Germany is that the occupying Western forces
acted as judge and jury. W h o , he asks
rhetorically, will be the judge in Poland,
where the courts are w e a k and the K G B
files are distorted?
"This is a problem without a good solution," the Polish legal scholar sighs.
F r o m Elster, the advice is simple: "Burn
the records. Burn the property records and
burn the archives of the secret police. Start
all over." While this option, advocated in
the Czech Republic by President Vaclav
Havel, m a y seem grossly simplistic, it does
circumvent the danger of becoming mired
in the past. In addition, Elster claims, the
risk that "the tyranny of the majority" may
prompt a witch hunt of collective guilt or
guilt by association outweighs any benefits
of retribution and restitution.
Whichever stand governments choose to
take on lustration or individualrights,they
bear the burden of creating democracies
able to separate powers so as not to repeat
autocracy—yet still able to produce an efficient government. As a result, says law professor Lessig, the question of separation of
powers is especially dear to East Europeans,
w h o , w h e n offered a spectrum of choices
for structuring their governments, are
almost overwhelmed by their options.
East Europeans fear a powerful executive,
Lessig observes, but they also don't quite
trust democracy 100 percent. Such giddy
tension, while manageable in a nation with
a history of separation of powers, stalls
nations unfamiliar with this concept or with
checks and balances.
Even the parliamentary structure, the
ubiquitous choice for governments
throughout most of Western Europe, must
vault major hurdles in the East—mainly
because voters in m a n y states feel alienated
from their parliaments after years of going
unheard or ignored. As Holmes observes:
"The sense that parliaments are corrupt,
that they are full of absenteeism, that the

elected representatives don't really represent anybody, is strong."
Nevertheless, conclude Holmes and his U
of C peers, the constitution-making
progress in Europe has been surprisingly
successful so far, if not impressively swift.
"Except for Yugoslavia and some places in
the former Soviet Union, w e have seen the
remarkable fact of massive social change
without violence," Holmes says. "Nobody
was sure that that could happen, but it has."
For its part, the Center for the
Study of Constitutionalism in
Eastern Europe has proven that
speed and flexibility rank
a m o n g its greatest achievements. "Normally, if you think about starting some major center like this," says Geof
Stone, "you would spend two years thinking it all out and trying to m a p out exactly
what it would do and h o w it would be organized. Then you'd submit all these grant
proposals, and refine the idea, and so on.
"Here, because of the fact that events were
happening, it had to begin with very little
sense of exactly what would happen. That
feel, for better or for worse, has continued."
The Center does operate on the assumption that if it exists indefinitely, seat-of-thepants or otherwise, it won't have achieved
its goal of chronicling the stages of a finite
set of decisions. A n d while the Center's
constitutional archives may be forever, most
of the Chicago forefathers agree that by
1997 or 1998, real decisions must be made
regarding if or w h e n to shutter the shop.
"In theory, the Center is designed to study
a transitional process," says Stone, w h o will
leave the Law School in January to become
University provost. "Hopefully, in the real
world, the process will not be a permanent
state of affairs."
Eastern Europe's inablity to spend its o w n
precious time or resources in setting up
archives has been remedied with a deluge of
help from abroad. In contrast, a lack of contemporary documents, news articles, or
drafts forces Americans to speculate on the
original intent of the Constitution's framers.
"Because of what we're doing, if 200 years
from n o w someone wants to k n o w about
the original intent of the framers of the Bulgarian constitution, they could find it here,"
says Stone. "They won't find it in Bulgaria."
Moreover, Stone adds, if Poland ends up
with a different constitutional system from
Ukraine's, the Center's files should tell an
inquisitive historian whether the aberration
is random or a reflection of personality.
"It's like having 15 kids all born on the
same day," Stone muses, "and being able to
study them over the course of time to try to
figure out what makes them different."

UNIVERSITY O F C H I C A G O M A G A Z I N E / O C T O B E R 1993

23

